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The US banking sector entered a bear market on 20 February 2007, with its Index losing over 20 
percent in value by September, during what has become known as the sub-prime crisis. Whilst its most 
public aspect was a series of spectacular write-offs in the second half of 2007 and early 2008
i and the 
collapse of Bear Sterns in March 2008, clear evidence of potential troubles had been gradually 
accumulating over the previous year, which – of course – is why the Banking Index fell.  
 
This article is a test of anecdotal evidence that insiders actively traded in securities around the 
emergence of market-sensitive information during the first half of 2007 as the market went from 
downplaying problems to strong concern in the space of a few months. The intuition is that successful 
insiders leave a record of their activity in unusual price and volume patterns in the options markets of 
securities that were most affected. The research intent is to examine trading in put options on stock in 
The Bear Sterns Companies (hereafter BSC or Bear) for evidence of hypothesised patterns of illegal 
insider trading. The hypotheses have been developed from previously published studies of insider 
trading in wagering and conventional markets and have been applied here to a single firm, over a 
single set of events to keep the study manageable. The principle objective of the paper is to use public 
information to identify patterns that suggest insider trading. 
 
In most economic transactions, one party knows more than the others (Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Weber, 1989). At the extreme this leads to Fama's (1970) `strong' market inefficiency, which means 
that an investor can profit from information that is not available to the general public: this is illegal in 
most jurisdictions. A small, but compelling, number of studies have concluded that illegal insider 
trading is common, especially around major corporate actions, including Amin and Lee (1997), Cao, 
Chen and Griffin (2005) and Jayaraman, Mandelker and Shastri (1991).  
 
Although quantifying the existence and level of insider activity is a longstanding analytical objective, 
most approaches have been narrow with a restrictive definition of insiders limited to “managers and 
members of the board of directors of publicly traded corporation” (Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 
2006: 2931). We look for guidance to studies that have applied techniques from forensic economics to 
study the activity of illegal insiders in wagering markets (Coleman, 2007 and Schnytzer and Shilony, 
1995) and equity markets (e.g. Meulbroek, 1992), and in manipulation of markets (such as outcomes 
of basketball games: Wolfers, 2006). 
 
We propose an innovation by combining concepts from behavioural finance with powerful databases 
to infer the level of the trading activity of these insiders. The approach follows analytical strategies 
that the authors have previously published in relation to insider trading in wagering markets and 
extends them to conventional markets, which has often been advocated (e.g. Thaler and Ziemba, 
1988). Coleman (2007) developed hypotheses about what patterns would be observed in market(s) if 
insiders were active, and used a long term database to test for their presence. Schnytzer and Shilony 
(1995; and subsequent papers) captured live trading information from parallel pari-mutuel betting 
markets and used it to reveal wagering with monopoly information. We believe that this is one of the 
first papers to comprehensively extend techniques that have proven useful in wagering studies to 
conventional markets.  
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This analysis assumes markets are not strongly efficient and follows „forensic economics‟
ii to identify 
periods when investors might have exploited monopoly information in the options market. These   3 
securities provide high delta (that is, sensitivity of the investment to the price of the underlying share) 
and enable investors to trade on margin and match option maturity to the timing of anticipated 
information: they afford profit opportunities that are not practicable with most shares.  
 
Although conventional wisdom has long held that insiders in the options market will buy out-of-the-
money options (e.g. Black, 1975), we believe that this leaves them vulnerable to detection by 
regulators (and herding by uninformed investors) because most trading by value is relatively close to 
the money. Thus we expect insiders will trade close to the money; and they will buy near to expiry 
options, which give greatest leverage and also have high volumes. For our test of anecdotal evidence 
that investors traded using market-sensitive monopoly information, we rely on four hypotheses. 
 
i. Options Volatility 
The implied volatility of an option quantifies its relative attractiveness after taking into account 
measurable market factors (the stock‟s price, interest rates, and option characteristics such as strike 
price and time to maturity). The assumption here is that illegal insiders exploit their information by 
buying options and hence bid up the price (and thus implied volatility) of put options ahead of the 
release of bad news. To control for overall market conditions, we standardise implied volatility by 
VIX, which is the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index. Our hypotheses are that 




ii. Option Bid-Offer Spread 
A number of papers have hypothesised that bid-ask spreads are a measure of information asymmetry 
in securities markets (e.g. Seyhun, 1986). The intuition is that investors protect themselves against 
counterparties with superior knowledge by widening the bid-ask spread. Our hypothesis is that option 
spreads will widen when insiders are in the market. 
 
iii. Option Price -Volume Patterns 
Basic microeconomics suggests that prices and volumes are correlated: price rises occur on relatively 
large volumes and price falls occur on relatively small volumes. In addition, the value of options 
traded places an obvious constraint on the ability of illegal inside traders to disguise their activity. Our 
hypothesis is that elevated traded value signals greater information flow and suggests insider activity. 
 
iv. Put:Call ratio 
The put:call ratio is a common indicator of activity in the options markets and is the ratio of the value 
of put options traded to call options traded: it indicates the balance between investments anticipating a 
market fall and those anticipating a rise. The value changes with market sentiment (rising in bear 
markets and vice versa) but a high ratio is consistent with insider belief that a particular stock will fall.  
 
A serendipitous benefit of using these tests is to avoid the joint hypothesis problem in which the 
analysis incorporates an uncertain theory (such as the market model). 
 
The study is not an open-ended evaluation of insider trading in general, but a focused search for 
possible illegal insider trading in one firm during a narrow window in the first six months of 2007. 
Choice of this period and firm were stimulated by a Reuters report of 21 December 2007 which said 
that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was investigating 36 companies in 
relation to the subprime market collapse. This and other press reports named a number of rumoured 
targets of the investigations for insider trading, and Bear Sterns was prominent in each.  
 
Data come from OptionMetrics daily data on exchange traded options. We use five filters to identify 
evidence of insider trading in BSC put options: 
i.  Implied volatility: average IV of BSC put options traded each day weighted by daily traded 
values 
ii.  IV Relative to VIX: Value of Implied Volatility divided by VIX.    4 
iii.  Spread: average of offer price minus bid price as a percentage of bid price, weighted by daily 
traded value 
iv.  Traded value: Value of put options traded by day 
v.  Put:Call Ratio: value of BSC put options traded divided by the value of call options traded. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This analysis is unashamedly retrospective: we adopt the perspective of a regulator seeking evidence 
of insider trading and use two sets of clues. The first is events that became public knowledge and in 
retrospect appear to have been opportunities to trade using inside knowledge. In the case of Bear 
Sterns, for instance, it reported a reduced quarterly profit on 14 June and the stock price fell in 
virtually a straight line for the following nine months.  
 
The second clue comes from trading activity. We hypothesise that insider activity will be indicated by 
the five filters, and identified days with the ten highest values. Consideration was given to following 
conventional event analysis and identifying days that were (say) in the top one percent based on the 
previous 200 days. However, trading activity was much higher in 2007 than 2006 and made this 
approach moot. 
 
Combining these two clues produces table 1. Out of the 124 trading days during January to June 2007, 
41 trigger one of the clues. After assembling the table, we used the Dow Jones news service Factiva 
and other on-line resources to identify events that might be price-sensitive for BSC‟s stock price.  
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Whilst interpretation of the table involves some subjectivity, two periods are most suggestive of 
insider activity: 
1.  During the five trading days 10-16 April, volatilities, spreads and trading values were high. 
BSC rallied during April, but losses in its two hedge funds that soon failed spectacularly 
(High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies and its Enhanced Leverage twin) rose from 4 to 23 
percent for the year.   
2.  BSC announced on 22 June that it would lend $3 billion to the two hedge funds. Information 
on the seriousness of this issue had been emerging since suspension of fund redemptions on 7 
June and liquidation of assets from before 13 June. Volatilities and volumes were high during 
6-22 June, with heavy volume on June 6 which was the day before hedge fund redemptions 
were suspended. 
 
Table 2 gives further granularity with details of principal option trades during the two possible insider 
trading periods of 10-16 April and 6-22 June. This shows that trading is highly concentrated: two 
thirds of the value of trades was in just four and nine contracts (Expiry Date X Strike Price), 
respectively, in the two periods. Two points stand out about the popular contracts: the strike prices are 
relatively close-to or just in-the-money; and the expiry dates are within two months. If these do 
represent insider trades, then the insiders are behaving logically and burying their activity in the high 
volume contracts close-to-the-money and near expiry.  
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Stories of insider trading confirm the worst suspicions of many investors and allegations are easy to 
make: reports are a media staple. Even though illegal insider trading is hard to prove and easy to 
dismiss, it seems all too prevalent: for example, Cornell and Sirri (1992) obtained detailed records of 
trading in a takeover firm during the month before its acquisition and found insiders bought 29 percent 
of the stock sold. 
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Our analysis indicates several periods during the first half of 2007 when trading in options on Bear 
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Table 1  
 
This table shows the 41 trading days (out of 124 during January-June 2007) that recorded one of the ten most extreme values in value-weighted Implied 
Volatility, IV standardised by VIX, and bid-ask spread; traded value of put options; and Put:Call ratio. Extreme is noted by *. Associated events are obtained 
by searching Factiva around dates.  
 





















Mean          0.2850  0.0219  5.39  3 213  1.24 
Std Devn          0.0394  0.0013  1.70  4 084  1.11 
                   
3 January    162.8  0.00  0.03  0.2334  0.0194  5.89  1,076  3.40* 
5 January    162.3  -0.98  -0.20  0.2379  0.0196  9.60*  607  0.98 
16 January  12 January: BSC shares peak at $172  170.6  0.26  -0.52  0.2632  0.0245  14.12*  257  0.41 
23 January    166.5  0.02  -1.60  0.2472  0.0239  10.03*  379  0.19 
24 January    169.9  0.54  2.01  0.2572  0.0260  11.13*  181  0.11 
25 January    164.7  -1.12  -3.02*  0.2420  0.0216  2.26  783  0.26 
29 January    162.1  -0.56  -1.23  0.2672  0.0233  4.40  5,117  4.03* 
1 February    165.3  0.17  0.26  0.2785  0.0270*  6.05  2,038  0.85 
5 February    165.1  0.09  -0.78  0.2593  0.0246  8.20*  249  0.41 
9 February    159.7  -0.83  -2.45*  0.2668  0.0240  5.40  3 623  0.29 
20 February    169.4  0.36  1.34  0.2879  0.0281*  5.46  938  0.51 
21 February    168.1  -0.25  -0.77  0.2920  0.0286*  7.68*  901  1.28 
22 February  HSBC fires head of mortgage lending   166.1  -0.12  -1.21  0.2971  0.0292*  4.16  1,909  1.42 
23 February    161.3  -0.74  -2.88*  0.3089  0.0292*  4.09  9 431  2.56 
26 February    158.2  0.00  0.03  0.2710  0.0290*  4.68  4 792  3.11* 
27 February    152.3  -3.29*  -3.74*  0.3321  0.0147  7.77*  17 142*  2.66* 
28 February  SEC charges BSC analysts with insider trading  152.2  0.26  -0.05  0.3278  0.0176  5.40  13 588*  2.44 
2 March  BSC hedge fund manager removes own money 
from funds 
147.5  -1.11  -2.79*  0.2379  0.0176  4.20  9 100  3.48* 
5 March  New Century Financial shares drop 69 percent  144.5  -1.47*  -2.03  0.3719*  0.0189  3.69  10 863*  6.66* 
12 March  Shares of New Century suspended  153.2  0.03  0.77  0.4257*  0.0304*  7.09  3 951  1.07 
13 March    143.0  -3.24*  -6.65*  0.4156*  0.0229  5.79  30 619*  6.55* 
14 March    145.3  0.7  1.62  0.4135*  0.0239  6.02  13 333*  0.76   7 
28 March  16 March: BSC reports 8% quarterly profit 
increase 
147.6  -1.19*  -0.87  0.2771  0.0185  3.62  1,533  0.93 
2 April    148.4  -1.15*  -1.27  0.2875  0.0198  4.40  2,772  1.53 
10 April    147.5  0.47  -1.04  0.3765*  0.0396*  2.24  8 669  4.44* 
12 April    148.3  -0.15  0.32  0.2742  0.0216  7.62*  396  0.01 
16 April    153.8  2.00  4.33  0.3741*  0.0313*  3.09  7,459  2.11 
19 April  Through April, YTD losses on hedge funds rise 
from 4 to 23 percent 
157.4  -0.30  0.22  0.2773  0.0221  8.93*  765  0.20 
1 May  25 April: BSC peaks at  $159; hedge fund 
investors falsely told of slight loss 
155.8  0.40  0.08  0.2850  0.0211  7.80*  1,264  0.79 
10 May    153.5  -1.66*  -1.30  0.2805  0.0206  5.34  941  0.80 
15 May  May 16-17: BSC stocks downgraded  150.6  0.04  -2.14  0.2743  0.0196  5.39  2,814  3.48* 
24 May  Goldman downgrades BSC   147.6  -0.59  -3.15*  0.2855  0.0203  4.59  2 790  0.76 
7June  7 June: two failing BSC hedge funds report 
losses and halt redemptions 
144.4  -1.35*  -2.90*  0.3148  0.0185  5.21  3,126  1.42 
11 June    148.4  0.22  0.39  0.4454*  0.0303*  6.71  1 803  0.56 
12 June  12-13 June: BSC hedge funds liquidating $4 
billion of assets 
146.0  -1.33*  -1.61  0.3646*  0.0219  4.22  4,797  1.27 
13 June  14 June: BSC reports profit fall  149.5  1.63*  2.39  0.3618*  0.0246  7.47  3,332  1.16 
20 June    143.2  -1.58*  -2.45  0.2631  0.0179  3.60  9 770*  3.16* 
22 June  BSC lends $3bill to hedge funds  143.8  -1.85*  -1.41  0.3146  0.0200  5.85  9 616*  1.99 
25 June    139.1  -0.46  -3.23*  0.3581*  0.0215  4.98  18 338*  1.57 
26 June    139.4  -0.19  0.18  0.3248  0.0172  4.31  11 887*  1.16 
29 June  BSC fires head of asset management  140.0  -0.79  -2.78*  0.3171  0.0195  4.21  9 285  2.21 
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Table 2 
This table covers the two possible insider trading periods and shows the traded values in $K of the most active contracts. 
Expiry date  BSC share 
price 
21 April  19 May  21 July  All 
Other 
TOTAL 
Strike  145  150  155  160  165  145  150  155  160  145  150  155  160 
10 April  147.5  48  403  38  169  6294  103  309  63  0  7  13  2  791  429  8,669 
11 April  147.8  23  255  38  17    27  57  23  13  8  43  1  12  555  1,072 
12 April  148.3  32  36  14      10  41  9    9  28  28  4  185  396 
13 April  147.4  31  104        2  129  45    11        140  462 
16 April  153.8  5  109  106  59  3046  31  162  44  10  6  57  25  3  3,796  7,459 
TOTAL    139  907  196  245  9340  173  698  184  23  41  141  56  810  5,105  18,058 
 
Expiry date  BSC share 
price 
16 June  21 July  All Other  TOTAL 
Strike  140  145  150  155  160  130  135  140  145  150  155  160 
6 June  148.7  28  64  111  163  250  21  9  9  19  442  37  384  970  2 507 
7 June  144.4  56  1 082  173  153    6  18  70  148  173  20  134  768  3,126 
8 June  147.8  30  282  153  451  14  52  5  200  192  507  24  29  952  3,332 
11 June  148.4  43  506  716  28  2  3  9  13  57  32  30  3  307  1,803 
12 June  146.0  26  482  1 023  95    3  15  163  202  61  150  82  1,509  4,797 
13 June  149.5  42  348  539  74    9  60  251  494  169  48  13  712  3,332 
14 June  149.6    27  350      4  45  84  232  384  53  1  770  2,753 
15 June  150.1            6  25  122  157  222  45  19  529  1,197 
18 June  148.0            5  32  393  287  697  81  26  422  2,319 
19 June  146.8            4  36  449  168  138  9  24  835  1,822 
20 June  143.2            113  414  1 546  856  608  1 952  69  2,064  9,770 
21 June  145.8            211  153  250  161  66  29  99  192  9,617 
22 June  143.8            237  441  2 390  1 147  1 199  148  66  1,778  9,616 
TOTAL    237  2847  3364  1030  298  682  1297  6033  4209  5202  715  980  11,808  53,483   9 
Footnotes 
                                            
i Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, for instance, each ultimately wrote-off more than $20 billion against 
mortgage loans after the second half of 2007 and lost their Chief Executive. UBS, Morgan Stanley, 
HSBC, and American International Group each wrote off more than $10 billion.    
ii Using its definition from Wolfers (2006: 279) which is “applying price-theoretic models to uncover 
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